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1. Introduction
Non-existential interpretations of indeﬁnites have greatly inﬂuenced the develop-
mentofformalsemantictheory, andmostnotablysosinceCarlson’s(1977)studyof
genericityandHeim’s(1982)andKamp’s(1981)worksonindeﬁnitesandanaphora.
These works stressed the fact that the syntactic environment in which an indeﬁnite
appears may determine to a large extent its quantiﬁcational interpretation or binding
potential. In this paper we show that prepositional phrases (PPs) are among the syn-
tactic environments that lead to non-existential effects with indeﬁnites. We observe
the variability in the quantiﬁcational force of indeﬁnites when they appear as PP
complements, and account for this new observation by synthesizing ideas from pre-
vious accounts of semantic incorporation, spatial prepositions and negative polarity
items. In a nutshell, we propose that the English a indeﬁnites can act as predicates,
and that such predicates are acceptable as direct arguments of locative prepositions.
This is very similar to the process that is assumed in theories of semantic incorpo-
ration (McNally 1992, Van Geenhoven 1998, Zimmermann 1993). In this account,
the interpretation of predicative indeﬁnites is governed not by quantiﬁcational ele-
ments within the DP but by other particles in the sentence: in our case, the prepo-
sition of which the indeﬁnite DP is an argument. This emphasis on external effects
on indeﬁnites is similar to theories of the generic, anaphoric, scopal or intensional
semantics of indeﬁnites. In this paper we couple the study of indeﬁnites with a
semantic domain that is especially rich and heterogeneous: the spatial semantics of
the PP. We employ parts of Zwarts and Winter’s (2000) treatment of PPs in vector
space semantics, relying especially on their analysis of PP semantic structure and
monotonicity properties. As we will show, this monotonicity, or its absence, is a
major factor that affects the quantiﬁcational behavior of predicative indeﬁnites in
PP complements – existential, universal or otherwise.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the problem of non-
existential indeﬁnites in PP complements. Section 3 introduces our proposal in
informal terms and describes its implications. Section 4 ﬂeshes out some central
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2. Quantiﬁcational Variability of PP Complements
Indeﬁnites that appear as PP complements show some systematic variations in their
interpretation, which to the best of our knowledge have not been observed before.
Consider the following scenario: you are driving in Nevada with a friend when
suddenly your car runs out of gas. Now consider the following two sentences that
you or your friend may utter in response to the situation:1
(1) a. We’re close to a gas station.
b. We’re far from a gas station.
Thetwosentencesobviouslyhavedifferentimplicationsforthefateofyourjourney.
While sentence (1a) means that some gas station must be close to where you are,
(1b) does not mean that some gas station is far away. Rather, sentence (1b) conveys
thestronger, unfavorable, propositionthatallgasstationsarefarfromyourlocation.
This dependency of the quantiﬁcational interpretation of indeﬁnites on the
preposition cannot be dismissed as a pragmatic effect. It appears in numerous con-
structions and circumstances where pragmatics is unlikely to matter. For instance,
consider the following variation on the contrast in (1).
(2) a. The house is

at most
less than

2km from a lake.
b. The house is

at least
more than

2km from a lake.
(a) (b)
Figure 1: close to/far from a lake
Traditionally, we may expect both occurrences of the indeﬁnite a lake in (2) to be
interpreted as an existential quantiﬁer. This is indeed the case in (2a), which is
1We thank Louise McNally for suggesting this example to us.
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when there is at least one lake which is less than two kilometers away from the
house, as it is the case in Figure 1a. However, as illustrated by the unacceptability
of (2b) in Figure 1b, the mere existence of a lake that is more than two kilometers
away from the house is not enough to make these sentences true. Apparently, the
prominent interpretation of the indeﬁnite in (2b) is universal: these sentences claim
that for every lake x, the house is at least (more than) 2km away from x.
Theuniversalinterpretationofthe indeﬁnitesinsentenceslike(1b)or(2b)is
not necessarily their only interpretation. When enough descriptive content is added
to it, the indeﬁnite may get a “speciﬁc”, wide-scope existential interpretation, as
would be expected by most theories of indeﬁnites. For instance:
(3) a. We’re far from a gas station that I read about in the guide, but I think there
must be another one nearby.
b. The house is more than 2km from a well-known lake that is very popular
among tourists, but there are two smaller lakes in a walking distance of
1km which are very nice and much quieter.
In such cases the universal reading of the indeﬁnite may be ruled out. To be sure –
it is not prominent in the same way it is in cases like (1b) or (2b).2 What is crucial
for us is that a similar universal/existential discrepancy does not show up in cases
like (1a) or (2a). It is quite impossible to think of a context where such sentences
would receive a deﬁnitely universal interpretation.
Existential/universal variability as in (1) and (2) is also found with the loca-
tives inside and outside. Consider the following examples.
(4) a. The dog is inside a doghouse.
b. The dog is outside a doghouse.
Sentence (4a) is interpreted existentially, as claiming that there is a doghouse x
such that the dog is inside x. Sentence (4b), on the other hand, is unlikely to be
interpreted in this way: its prominent reading entails that the dog is outside all the
doghouses.
There are also interpretations of indeﬁnite PP complements that are neither
existential nor universal. Consider the following example.
(5) The dog is less than 20m outside a doghouse.
Sentence (5) shows a non-existential effect, but one that is not strictly universal. For
this sentence to be true the dog should not be inside any doghouse, and there should
also be a doghouse x such that the dog is less than 20m from x. Thus, in this case
the preposition outside contributes the universal import as in (4b) and the measure
phrase less than 20m contributes an existential import as in (2a).
Another complex quantiﬁcational effect is illustrated in (6) below.
(6) The bird is more than 20m above a cloud.
2Proponents of Schwarzschild’s (2002) “singleton indeﬁnites” may prefer to regard the appar-
ently existential indeﬁnites in (3) as universal quantiﬁers with singleton domains.
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but the preposition interferes. In (6), the bird is not claimed to be more than 20m
above all the clouds. Rather, only clouds that are below the bird are universally
quantiﬁed over. Clouds above the bird do not matter for assessing the truth of the
non-existential interpretation of (6). Intuitively, this semi-universal effect stems
from the universal effect triggered by the measure phrase more than 20m, together
with the restriction imposed by the preposition above on the region that is relevant
for evaluating (6).
Another way of triggering quantiﬁcational effects that are neither existential
nor universal is illustrated in the following examples.
(7) a. The house is exactly 100m from a lake.
b. The house is between 100m and 200m from a lake.
While the downward/upward monotonicity of the measure phrases (MPs) in (2)
triggers the existential/universal interpretation of the indeﬁnite, the MPs in (7) are
non-monotone.3 These MPs are equivalent to the following conjunctions of down-
ward monotonic MPs with upward monotonic MPs (e.g. exactly 100m = at least
100m and at most 100m). Expectedly, the quantiﬁcational force given to the indef-
inites in (7) is semi-existential/semi-universal. Sentence (7a) is equivalent to the
claim that the house is at most 100m from a lake and at least 100m from a lake.
Thus, (7a) claims that there is a lake x such that the house is at most 100m from
x (existential import of at most), and for every lake y the house is at least 100m
from y (universal import of at least). In other words: the closest lake to the house
is exactly 100m away from it. The effect in (7b) is similar.
So far we have considered only indeﬁnites with the article a as showing
non-existential effects in PP complements. It is important to note that the some
indeﬁnites in English do not show similar quantiﬁcational variability effects. Con-
sider for instance the following examples, in contrast with sentences (1b) and (4b)
above.
(8) We’re far from some gas station.
(9) The dog is outside some doghouse.
These examples, in contrast to their parallels with the article a, only show an exis-
tential interpretation of the indeﬁnite. In the account that we present in the follow-
ing section, we take this as an important clue for the origins of the non-existential
effects with a indeﬁnites.
Moving on to other DPs, we note that similar effects to the ones we observed
with a indeﬁnites, also appear with bare plurals and plural deﬁnites, and even with
singular deﬁnites that denote objects with a mereological structure. Consider the
following examples.
(10) We’re close to/far from lakes.
(11) We’re close to/far from the lakes.
3In Section 4 we say more on the monotonicity properties of MPs and prepositions, and their
formal effects on the interpretation of indeﬁnite PP complements.
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In (10) and (11), existential/universal quantiﬁcation over lakes is triggered by the
locative expression, in a similar way to the contrast in (1). The statements made
in (12) are that we are close to some part of the lake and far from all parts of the
lake, respectively. We believe that the variability effects in (10)-(12) stem from the
same principles about the interpretation of spatial expressions that we propose in
this paper. However, we do not concentrate here on the interpretative strategies in
such examples, and leave the semantics of plurals and part-whole structures beyond
the scope of this paper.
3. Incorporation as a Source of Quantiﬁcational Variability
Toaccountfornon-existentialinterpretationsofindeﬁnitePPcomplements, wetake
the contrast between the articles a and some (1b-4b vs. 8-9) as especially telling.
Consider another case where a contrast appears between these two English articles:
(13) a. I consider John a pianist.
b. ??I consider John some pianist.
A prominent approach for analyzing such contrasts between a and some is to as-
sume that the article a, as opposed to some, allows a predicative reading for the
indeﬁnite. By “predicative” we mean that the indeﬁnite a pianist is interpreted as
synonymous with the noun pianist and not as an existential quantiﬁer. In (13a), the
application of the predicate denoted by the noun to the entity denoted by John is
sanctioned by virtue of the predicative treatment of the a indeﬁnite.4
We propose that sentences like we’re close to/far from a gas station in (1)
are similarly interpreted using the predicative reading of the indeﬁnite. The spatial
expression close to/far from denotes here a relation between the location of the
subject and the location of the predicate gas station. But what does it mean to
“locate a predicate”? Intuitively, it is easy to think of the location of entities as their
physical location in space or some abstraction thereof. A one-place predicate over
physical entities can be thought of as a collection of such entities. We adopt the
straightforward assumption that the location of such a collection is the union of the
locations of the entities in it. Thus, to be close to (or far from) a gas station, under
the predicative reading of this indeﬁnite, is to be close to (far from) the union of
the locations of individual gas stations. Now, the existential/universal contrast we
have seen follows directly from general assumptions about the meanings of locative
expressions. For what is it to be close to or far from an object? It is to be close to
(or far from) the closest part of this object. Thus, to be close to the union of gas
station locations is to be close to the closest gas station, one gas station nearby is
sufﬁcient for this to be true. The location of farther gas stations is irrelevant. Thus,
with close to we get an interpretation that is equivalent to the effect of an existential
4See (Winter 2001) and references therein for more elaborate semantic accounts.
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the nearest gas station. But as a matter of the meaning of far from, all other gas
stations must be further away from that gas station. We therefore get an impression
of universal quantiﬁcation. Thus both sentences in (1) exhibit direct application
of a spatial relation to a location of a predicate, and the differences between their
interpretations follow from the different meanings of the spatial relations.
This analysis intuitively extends to the other quantiﬁcational variability ef-
fects we have observed above. In (4a), the dog is inside the union of the locations
of the doghouses if it is inside at least one of those regions. By contrast, in (4b),
the dog is outside the union of locations if it is outside all of the doghouses. In (5),
the usual interpretation of less than 20m outside x is that the entity is less than 20m
from x and not inside x. If we substitute the combined locations of all doghouses for
x, we get the quantiﬁcational effect in this example: the dog has to be less than 20m
away from some doghouse and outside all doghouses. The analysis of (6) is similar
to that of (5) once we take into account the more complex semantics of above.I n
(7a), once again we measure distances to the nearest point in a region: an entity x is
exactly 100m from a region R if there is a point in R which is exactly 100m from x,
and there is no point in R that is closer to x. Hence, in (7a) there should be at least
one lake which is exactly 100m from the house, and no lake can be nearer. The
semi-existential/semi-universal effect is thus explained. In (7b) the explanation is
similar.
The idea that indeﬁnites can act as the direct arguments of linguistic pred-
icates is not new – it underlies some recent theories of semantic incorporation.A
common motivation of these theories, whose origins can be traced back to Carl-
son’s treatment of bare plural indeﬁnites, is to handle exceptional narrow scope
interpretations of indeﬁnites. In some cases, incorporation is used in cases where
a narrow scope reading is obligatory. For instance, (McNally 1992) uses semantic
incorporation to handle obligatory narrow scope with there sentences, as in there
isn’t a cloud in the sky. Likewise, (Van Geenhoven 1998) uses incorporation to han-
dle obligatory narrow scope in transitive constructions of West Greenlandic, such
as John ﬁsh-buy-NEG-IND-[tr]-3sg, which means “it is not true that there exists a
ﬁsh that John buy” and not “there exists a ﬁsh that John did not buy”. Semantic
incorporation is also used by (Zimmermann 1993) and (McNally and Van Geen-
hoven 2005) to account for cases where indeﬁnites get a narrow scope reading as
opposed to other NPs. One of these cases is the well-known behavior of indeﬁnites
in intensional contexts. For instance, the sentence Mary is looking for a dog shows
an optional, non-existential, de dicto interpretation of the indeﬁnite. This reading is
often treated as application of the intensional predicate look for to the indeﬁnite’s
denotation. In Zimmermann’s account this denotation is a property – the intension
of a predicative indeﬁnite. In a similar way, we propose that the non-existential
reading of constructions like far from a gas station is obtained by application of the
relation far from to the predicative denotation of the indeﬁnite. In the next section,
we elaborate on the details of this proposal.
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So far we have seen that using semantic incorporation of indeﬁnites, the variability
in their quantiﬁcational force may follow from the different spatial relations that
PPs denote. We would now like to analyze in more detail the ways in which spa-
tial relations affect the quantiﬁcational behavior of indeﬁnites. In order to do that
we need a formal account of the process that was informally described in Section
3. We do that in two steps: ﬁrst we suggest a semantic structure for PPs with in-
deﬁnite complements that is based on our analysis of semantic incorporation within
locatives. We then use this scheme for characterizing the relations between preposi-
tional meanings and the quantiﬁcational interpretation of indeﬁnites in PP comple-
ments. It turns out that our incorporation operator expects strong relationships be-
tween the semantic (anti-)additivity properties of the prepositional construction and
the existential/universal interpretation of the indeﬁnite complement. After studying
these relationships, we show some of their interactions the analysis of PP mono-
tonicity, the distribution of negative polarity items and some cases of non-locative
prepositions.
4.1. PP Semantic Structure
Most theories of prepositions assume that a locative PP establishes a relation be-
tween a reference object and a located object. In a sentence like the tree is behind
the house, the tree entity is located relative to the object denoted by the PP com-
plement the house. A natural way to represent the meaning of locative prepositions
is using regions in a spatial ontology (Nam 1995). A region is a part of the space
speciﬁed according to the chosen ontology. For the main purposes of this paper it is
sufﬁcient to assume that spatial regions are described using sets of points, endowed
with the standard set-theoretical operations and relations between them.5 Any phys-
ical object is mapped to the region it occupies – its eigenspace (Wunderlich 1991).
The semantics of locative PPs is given using a prepositional function from regions
to sets of regions. A prepositional function receives as argument the eigenspace
of the reference object and returns the set of regions possible as eigenspaces for
potential located objects.6
Consider the following prepositional functions.
5Ignoring topological relations in the semantics of the PP is an oversimpliﬁcation, of course,
and for the sake of the analysis in Subsection 4.4 of measure phrase modiﬁcation we will have to
introduce distance relations. For more on spatial ontology in the analysis of prepositions see (Nam
1995, Zwarts and Winter 2000, Kracht 2002).
6It may sometimes be simpler to deﬁne prepositional functions as functions from regions to
regions, rather than to sets of regions as it is deﬁned here . In that case the region returned by a
prepositional function would have to contain the eigenspace of the located object, rather than have
it as a member. This practice is taken in (Zwarts and Winter 2000) but we abandon it here since
the present implementation is more useful for introducing our proposal. However, moving back and
forth between the two perspectives on prepositions is mechanical, by changing the deﬁnition of the
“anti-location” function loc−1 (see below).
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b. outside (A)(B) ⇔ B∩A = / 0
c. close to (A)(B) ⇔ dist(B,A) ≤ c
d. far from (A) ⇔ dist(B,A) ≥ f
The preposition inside denotes here the set containment relation: a sentence like
x is inside y is interpreted as stating that the eigenspace of x is contained in the
eigenspace of y. Similarly, the preposition outside denotes the disjointness relation,
and the denotations of the locative constructions close to and far from are deﬁned
using a distance function dist in a natural way, with the pragmatic constants c and
f as distance values for close and far.
We use the notation ‘loc’ for the location function that maps any physical
entity x to its eigenspace loc(x). From (Zwarts and Winter 2000) we borrow the
idea of using an “inverse” function loc−1, which here receives a set of regions R
and returns the set of objects loc−1(R) with an eigenspace is R. Formally:
(15) loc−1(R)={x : loc(x) ∈ R}
The semantic structure that we assume for locative PPs is summarized in (16).
(16) loc−1(P(loc(x)))
. x is the reference object o ft h eP P–ap h ysical entity of type e.
. loc is the location function – from e-type entities to their eigenspace
regions.
. P is the prepositional function of the PP – a function from regions to
sets of regions, or equivalently – a relation between regions.
. loc−1 is the anti-location function – from a set of regions R to the set
of entities whose eigenspace is in R.
For example, in a locative PP like outside the meadow, the loc function maps the
meadow entity m  to its eigenspace M = loc(m ). The locative outside maps the
region M to the set of regions that do not overlap M. The loc−1 function returns
the set of entities that occupy these regions – the one-place predicate that speciﬁes
the entities outside the meadow. As a result, the sentence the house is outside the
meadow receives the following semantic analysis:
(17) (loc−1(outside (loc(m ))))(h )
⇔ loc(h ) ∈ outside (loc(m ))
⇔ H ∈ outside (M)
⇔ H ∩M = / 0
In words: the eigenspaces H and M of the house and the meadow are disjoint.
The semantic structure in (16), which is adopted with some modiﬁcations
from Zwarts and Winter’s work, is used here as the basis for our treatment of indef-
inite PP complements. To implement our assumption that a prepositional function
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tor. Using this operator, instead of applying the prepositional function P to the
eigenspace of a single entity as in (16), we apply it to the union of eigenspaces of
entities in a predicate’s extension. To get this union, we deﬁne the location function
loc∪ over predicates as follows.
(18) loc∪(F)=

{loc(x) : F(x)}
HereF isthedenotationofapredicateoverphysicalentities. Theresultingsemantic
structure of a PP with a predicative complement is the following:
(19) loc−1(P(loc∪(F)))
. F is a predicate of type et over reference objects.
. loc∪ is the location function over predicates – from et-type predicates to
regions.
. P and loc−1 are as described in (16).
For example, in the expression outside a meadow, the semantic structure we assume
is the following:
(20) loc−1(outside (loc∪(meadow 
et)))
The function loc∪ sends the predicative indeﬁnite a meadow to the union of the
eigenspaces of the relevant meadows. The function outside  returns the sets disjoint
to that union, and loc−1 returns the entities that occupy such sets: the entities that do
not overlap with any of the meadows. In formula, the sentence the house is outside
a meadow (cf. 4b) is analyzed as follows.
(21) The house is outside a meadow.
(loc−1(outside (loc∪(meadow 
et))))(h )
⇔ loc(h ) ∈ outside (

{loc(x) : meadow (x)})
⇔ H ∈{ R : R∩

{loc(x) : meadow (x)} = / 0}
⇔ H ∩

{loc(x) : meadow (x)} = / 0
Assuming that the set of meadows is ﬁnite, we get:
⇔∀ x[meadow (x) → H ∩loc(x)=/ 0]
⇔∀ x[meadow (x) → (loc−1(outside (loc(x))))(h )]
In words: for every meadow x, the house is outside x.
In this derivation we see how our incorporation-based analysis using the loc∪ func-
tion derives a pseudo-universal interpretation of the predicative indeﬁnite with the
preposition outside. Broadening our view, we would like to have a general char-
acterization of the quantiﬁcational effects with predicative indeﬁnites as dependent
on the prepositional function they complement. We now move on to introduce our
analysis of these semantic dependencies.
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The universal analysis of the locative outside a meadow in (21) relies on a special
property of the locative outside. A house that is outside a ﬁnite union of eigenspaces
is outside each of these eigenspaces, and vice versa. Our treatment of the preposi-
tional function for outside as the disjointness relation naturally supports this prop-
erty. Generalizing, we say that the preposition outside is anti-additive where anti-
additivity is deﬁned below, following (Zwarts 1998, S´ anchez-Valencia et al. 1994,
Nam 1997).7
Deﬁnition 1 A preposition function P is called anti-additive if for all regions A,B:
P(A∪B)=P(A)∩P(B).
In the semantic structure we have assumed, we get the universal interpretation for
anyanti-additiveprepositionalfunctionPduetothefollowingequivalenceforevery
predicate F that holds of a ﬁnite set of entities:8
(22) y ∈ loc−1(P(loc∪(Fet)))
⇔ loc(y) ∈ P(

{loc(x) : F(x)}) (by deﬁnition of loc−1 and loc∪)
⇔ loc(y) ∈

x:F(x) P(loc(x)) (deﬁnition of anti-additivity)
⇔∀ x[F(x) → loc(y) ∈ P(loc(x))]
⇔∀ x[F(x) → y ∈ loc−1(P(loc(x)))] (by deﬁnition of loc−1)
Now it is clear why the locatives outside and far from trigger universal read-
ings of predicative indeﬁnite complements. These prepositions denote anti-additive
functions, as informally illustrated by the following equivalences.
(23) a. We’re outside Eurasia ⇔ we’re outside Europe and outside Asia.
b. We’re far from Eurasia ⇔ we’re far from Europe and far from Asia.
Theanti-additivityoftheprepositionalfunctionsthatweassumedin(14)foroutside
and far from formally reﬂects their inferential behavior in (23). This anti-additivity
does not appear with the other prepositional constructions that we have considered.
Especially, the locatives inside and close to are not anti-additive, as the following
invalid entailments show.
(24) a. We’re inside Eurasia  ⇒ We’re inside Europe.
We’re inside Eurasia  ⇒ We’re inside Asia.
b. We’re close to Eurasia  ⇒ We’re close to Europe.
We’re close to Eurasia  ⇒ We’re close to Asia.
7In a principle referred to as the principal ﬁlter property, (Winter 2001) takes anti-additivity to be
responsible for the union-like (“collective”) interpretation of intersections of generalized quantiﬁers.
8The behavior of prepositions over inﬁnite unions is a question we set aside here, like many other
mathematical questions about the behavior of prepositional functions.
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versal” interpretation for indeﬁnites with those prepositional constructions, as anti-
additivity is necessary for the equivalence in (22) to hold.
Anti-additivity is closely related to the notion of downward monotonicity.
Standardly, a function is called upward (downward) monotone if it preserves (re-
verses) order on its arguments. Zwarts and Winter (2000) demonstrate that like
other expressions in natural language, locative prepositions exhibit a variety of
monotonicity properties.9 The following deﬁnition standardly describes the mono-
tonicity of prepositional functions.10
Deﬁnition 2 Let P be a prepositional function.
1. P is upward monotone if for all regions A,B: A ⊆ B ⇒ P(A) ⊆ P(B).
2. P is downward monotone if for all regions A,B: A ⊆ B ⇒ P(B) ⊆ P(A).
Downward monotonicity follows directly from anti-additivity. Intuitively, the left-
to-right entailments in (23) establish the downward monotonicity of the preposi-
tional constructions outside and far from. By contrast, the non-anti-additive prepo-
sitional constructions inside and close to are furthermore not downward monotone,
as the invalid entailments in (24) illustrate.
The examples we know for downward monotone prepositional construc-
tions are outside and far from, as well as the semantically similar construction at
least/more than n meters from. It seems little coincidence that these constructions
are furthermore anti-additive. Most prepositional constructions we know have a
property that we can call cumulativity. A prepositional function P is cumulative
if for all regions A,B: P(A∪B) ⊇ P(A)∩P(B). Anti-additivity is equivalent to
cumulativity plus downward monotonicity. Cumulativity is prevalent with preposi-
tional constructions, also with those that are not downward monotone. Consider for
instance the following examples, with the prepositions above and close to.
(25) a. The cloud is above the house and above its grounds ⇒ the cloud is
above the premises.
b. We’re close to Europe and close to Asia ⇒ we’re close to Eurasia.
However, cumulativity is not a universal property of prepositional constructions.
Consider for instance a satellite over Canada, which is diagonally above Alaska,
as well as diagonally above the bulk of the US. Even ignoring Hawaii, it would be
strange to assert that the satellite is diagonally above US territory. Thus, diago-
nally above is unlikely to be a cumulative prepositional construction. This is more
graphically illustrated in Figure 2a.
9See (Zimmermann 2006) for a recent study of the monotonicity properties of intensional verbs,
which as we mentioned above, are highly related to the theory of semantic incorporation.
10Zwarts and Winter refer to point monotonicity since in their semantics, the region argument of
a prepositional function is a set of points. Simplifying, we here use the term monotonicity. It should
be noted that the modiﬁcation of the type for prepositional functions that we introduce here leads to
a different characterization of these functions in terms of their monotonicity. Empirical matters do
not hinge on this fact too much, since we have adjusted here the operation of the loc−1 function to
match the different type we assume for prepositions.
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Figure 2: (a) x is diagonally above A and diagonally above B, but not diagonally
above A∪B. (b) The circle is in the squares but not in a square.
4.3. Additivity and Pseudo-Existential Indeﬁnites
Preposition additivity is deﬁned similarly to anti-additivity:
Deﬁnition 3 A preposition function P is called additive if for all regions A,B:
P(A∪B)=P(A)∪P(B).
Unlike the clear parallelism between universal interpretations of indeﬁnites and the
anti-additivity of far from and outside, the relations between additivity and exis-
tential interpretations require a more complex semantic analysis. Consider ﬁrst the
prepositional construction close to and the empirical status of the following addi-
tivity entailment tests.
(26) a. We’re close to Eurasia ⇒ We’re close to Europe or close to Asia.
b. We’re close to Eurasia
? ⇐ We’re close to Europe or close to Asia.
There is little question about the validity of the entailment in (26a). At ﬁrst blush,
also the entailment in (26b) seems perfectly valid. This entailment is characteristic
of the upward monotone prepositional constructions. But does it hold for close to?
Suppose that we are in Asia and have gotten close to European territories. Thus
the ﬁrst disjunct in the righthand side of (26b) is certainly true. Does it follow that
we are close to Eurasia in such a case? To be sure, it would be rather infelicitous
to state that we are close to Eurasia when in fact, we are in Eurasia. Now we
have one of two theoretical alternatives: either (i) conclude that close to is not an
upward monotone preposition; or (ii) assume that close to is upward monotone,
and attribute the infelicity of A is close to B when A is in B to a pragmatic effect.
Fortunately, we do not have to choose between these options here since both of
them are consistent with our account of indeﬁnite PP complements. Under the
non-monotonicity assumption (i), a sentence like we’re close to a gas station is
simply non-existential, since it requires, in addition to the existence of a gas station
nearby, that we are outside all gas stations. Thus, non-additivity in this case would
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in (ii), then close to is assumed to be additive, and our semantic analysis of the
indeﬁnite in close to a gas station would remain purely existential. The additional
implication that we’re outside all gas stations would then be analyzed as pragmatic.
The situation with the preposition inside is more complicated. While being
upward monotone (cf. 27b below), this preposition is clearly non-additive, as the
invalid entailment (27a) shows.
(27) a. This territory is inside Eurasia  ⇒ This territory is inside Europe or
inside Asia.
b. This territory is inside Eurasia ⇐ This territory is inside Europe or
inside Asia.
From the formal proposal above, we would therefore expect the indeﬁnite in a sen-
tence like (28) below to be non-existential.
(28) The circle is inside a square.
For instance, a circle that is contained in two squares as in Figure 2b would be
expected to satisfy a non-existential reading of (28). But evidently, this sentence is
univocally false in Figure 2b, and the indeﬁnite in it is purely existential. Note that
this is no longer the case if we replace the singular a square in (28) by a plural like
(the) squares: the sentences the circle is inside (the) squares are true in Figure 2b.
We thus hypothesize that the existential reading of (28) results from some special
aspects of the meaning of the singular indeﬁnite, and not simply from the meaning
of the preposition. That non-existential singular indeﬁnites behave differently than
plurals has been observed in the literature on genericity. For instance, consider
the contrast in collective generic sentences like tigers/*a tiger gather(s) at night.
We speculate that the existential reading of (28) may be a result of this “singular-
property” aspect of the meaning of singular indeﬁnites. However, we leave the
investigation of this aspect to further research.
4.4. MP Monotonicity and Prepositional (Anti-)Additivity
Reconsider the sentences in (2), restated below.
(29) a. The house is

at most
less than

2km from a lake.
b. The house is

at least
more than

2km from a lake.
In these sentences we have seen a correlation between the identity of the modiﬁed
numeral within the measure phrase and the existential/universal interpretation of
the indeﬁnite. Abstracting away from the measuring unit (meters, kilometers, etc.),
let us assume that measure phrases denote subsets of the non-negative real numbers
R+.11 Generalizing the deﬁnitions of the denotations in (14c)-(14d) of the prepo-
11Measuring units will only require multiplying these numbers by the proper constants, e.g. 0.001
for meters and 1 for kilometers, or any other constants with the proper relation between them (e.g. 1
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for the denotation of the construction MP from, where MP  is the denotation of the
measure phrase (e.g. less/more than 2km).
(30) MP from (A)(B) ⇔ dist(B,A) ∈ MP 
We assume the following denotations for the different MPs in (29):
(31) a. at most 2km  = {r : r ≤ 2}
less than 2km  = {r : r < 2}
b. at least 2km  = {r : r ≥ 2}
more than 2km  = {r : r > 2}
According to these denotations and the deﬁnition in (30), we get the following
denotations for the prepositional constructions in (29).
(32) a. at most 2km from (A)(B) ⇔ dist(B,A) ≤ 2
less than 2km from (A)(B) ⇔ dist(B,A) < 2
b. at least 2km from (A)(B) ⇔ dist(B,A) ≥ 2
more than 2km from (A)(B) ⇔ dist(B,A) > 2
Trivially, theMPdenotationsin(31a)and(31b)aredownward/upwardmono-
tone respectively in the set R+ of non-negative real numbers.12 What is a little bit
surprising is that we have already seen that the denotations of the prepositional
correlates of these MPs – in (32a) and (32b) respectively – may have the opposite
(upward/downward) monotonicity.13 Furthermore, as argued above, these preposi-
tional constructs are additive and anti-additive, respectively. How does monotonic-
ity reverse when composing MPs into prepositional constructions? The answer is
not too hard when looking further into the behavior of the distance relation dist in
deﬁnition (30).
Following Zwarts and Winter (2000), we deﬁne the distance function using
a metric on the points in our ontology.14 Given such a metric d, we can deﬁne
distance between regions as the following inﬁmum:15
For any two regions A,B: dist(A,B)=inf{d(x,y) : x ∈ A,y ∈ B}.
For this deﬁnition, we show the following fact about the (anti-)additivity of the
denotation (30) of a prepositional expression MP from, as a function of the mono-
tonicity of the measure phrase MP.
for meters and 1000 for kilometers).
12For a detailed analysis of the semantics of MPs and their MP modiﬁcation constructions see
Winter (2005).
13For the sake of the discussion here we assume that at most/less than 2km from are indeed upward
monotone, as the pragmatic assumption on the compatibility of close to with inside would expect.
14For a set X,ametric over X is a function from X ×X to R+ that satisﬁes for all x,y,z ∈ X:
d(x,y)=d(y,x), d(x,y)+d(y,z) ≥ d(x,z), and d(x,y)=0i f fx = y.
15Recall that inﬁmum is the greatest lower bound for (possibly) inﬁnite sets – the generalization
of the minimum function for ﬁnite sets.
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If M is upward monotone in R+ then fM is anti-additive.
If M is downward monotone in R+ then fM is additive.
Intuitively, when an MP is upward monotone, the distance between A∪B
andC isintheMP’sdenotationifandonlyifbothdistancesdist(A,C)anddist(B,C)
are in the MP’s denotation. Similarly, when an MP is downward monotone, the dis-
tance between A∪B andC is in the MP’s denotation if and only if at least one of the
distances dist(A,C) and dist(B,C) is in the MP’s denotation. This property stems
from the property dist(A∪B,C)=min(dist(A,C),dist(B,C)), which is a direct re-
sult of the deﬁnition of the distance function as an inﬁmum.
Not every MP is upward monotone or downward monotone. Some MPs,
such as exactly 10km or between 10m and 20m are neither upward nor downward
monotone. However, these MPs denote conjunctions of monotonic functions. As
a result, the resulting prepositional constructions exactly 10km from and between
10m and 20m from denote intersections of an anti-additive prepositional function
with an additive prepositional function. This accounts for the combined existential-
universal effects with such MPs that we observed in Section 2.
4.5. Further Implications: Negative Polarity Items and Non-Locative Prepositions
The characterization of some locatives as anti-additive (or downward monotone)
functions has ramiﬁcations for the analysis of negative polarity items (NPIs). In
the literature on NPIs since (Ladusaw 1979) it has become customary to observe
that downward monotone operators license the appearance of NPIs like any or ever
in their scope, whereas upward monotone and non-monotone operators do not. It
is therefore unsurprising that we observe the following contrasts between locative
prepositions with respect to their NPI licensing.
(33) a. We’re far from/?close to any gas station.
b. The house is more than 2km/?less than 2km from any lake.
c. This factory is outside/?inside any industrial area.
The distinction between anti-additive functions and other downward mono-
tone functions was used in the literature on NPIs (Zwarts 1998, S´ anchez-Valencia
et al. 1994, Nam 1997). The so-called strong NPIs like English yet and Dutch ook
maar were claimed to require anti-additive contexts, whereas weak NPIs like En-
glish any or ever were claimed to only require downward monotone environments
for their licensing. We will leave the characterization of NPIs with locative prepo-
sitions to further research.
Although as far as we know, locative prepositions were not extensively stud-
ied in the literature on NPIs, temporal prepositions were. Consider the following
English examples from (Nam 1997):
(34) a. Mary arrived before anyone left the party.
b. *Mary arrived after anyone left the party.
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al. (1994) argue that before is an anti-additive preposition. (Nam 1997) strengthens
this claim by studying strong NPIs in Korean and Japanese. Nam points out that
NPIs like teisang (Korean, ‘anymore’) and soreizyoo (Japanese, ‘anymore’) appear
in complements of before although they do not appear in downward monotone en-
vironments that are not anti-additive.
Given this background, it is surprising that it is not easy to attest a differ-
ence between before and after when they appear with indeﬁnite complements. For
instance, both sentences below have an existential interpretation for the indeﬁnite
description a war.
(35) a. This shelter was built before a war.
b. This shelter was built after a war.
We would expect sentence (35a) to have a universal interpretation equivalent to this
shelter was built before all wars. This expectation is not borne out, for reasons that
we will not study here. However, we should point out that contrasts that are very
similar to the ones we observed in (6), repeated below, can also be observed with
temporal PPs.
(36) The bird is more than 20m above a cloud. (=6)
In (36), the bird is claimed to be more than 20m above all the clouds below it.
Similarly, in (37) below, it is claimed that the shelter was built more than two years
after/before all wars that started before/after it was built.
(37) This shelter was built more than two years after/before a war.
We conclude that incorporation is also useful for the analysis of temporal PPs with
indeﬁnite complements, but its exact interaction with the meanings of temporal
prepositions requires further study. Another issue that we will have to leave for
further research is the interaction of predicative indeﬁnites with directional prepo-
sitions.16 Consider the following example.
(38) We went around a lake.
Sentence (38) can only be interpreted using existential quantiﬁcation over lakes.
There is no interpretation of (38) according to which we went around a collection
of lakes. We believe that this apparent lack of incorporation effects is similar to
the effect we mentioned above with the singular indeﬁnite and the locative inside in
sentence (28).
5. Conclusions
As pointed out in the introduction, we believe that PP complements should be put
alongside generics and donkey anaphora as one of the apparently extensional con-
texts that support non-existential interpretations of indeﬁnites. As in other similar
16Thanks to Joost Zwarts for pointing out this problem to us.
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nomenon of the semantics of the indeﬁnite’s environment. In the case of spatial
locative prepositions, we aimed to show that non-existential effects with indeﬁnites
result from direct predication of the prepositional meaning to the predicate denoted
by the indeﬁnite, combined with the denotational properties of spatial PPs. The
use of semantic incorporation has become popular in recent years for treating in-
tensional transitive constructions as well as other phenomena in various languages.
While these applications of incorporation are certainly new, we believe that they
ultimately reshape and extend Carlson’s classical treatment of generic bare plurals
as kind referring. In the areas of intensionality and genericity, there is still an on-
going debate whether semantic incorporation is advantageous to quantiﬁcational
techniques for treating indeﬁnites. Many authors have argued that genericity opera-
tors and intensional existential quantiﬁers are advantageous to kinds and properties
in the treatment of genericity and intensionality. In relation to spatial locative PPs,
however, we have shown strong evidence for the predicative analysis of indeﬁnites
as the direct argument of prepositional relations. On the whole we believe that
these evidence support non-quantiﬁcational approaches to indeﬁnites, and that their
broader theoretical ramiﬁcations merit further research.
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